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Handcrafting visual features of emails or landing pages to detect phishing
ABSTRACT
In a phishing attack, a perpetrator attempts to obtain the online credentials of a user by
impersonating a trusted entity such as a bank, email service provider, etc. Sophisticated phishers
attempt to deceive spam filters by structuring the visual look-and-feel of their fake emails to be
nearly but not precisely identical to emails sent by a trusted entity, such that spam filters allow
the fake email to reach a user’s inbox.
This disclosure describes use of hand-crafted visual features of emails or landing pages,
and classification based on earth-mover’s distance, to assess the visual similarity of genuine and
phished emails. The techniques detect visual near-duplicates of a trusted entity’s email and
thereby achieve resilience against phishing attacks.
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BACKGROUND
In a phishing attack, a perpetrator attempts to obtain the online credentials of a user by
impersonating a trusted entity such as a bank, email service provider, etc. Phishers send emails to
users (e.g., bank account-holders, email account holders, etc.) that look nearly identical to those
sent by the trusted entity. Email service providers deploy spam/phishing filters to thwart such
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attacks, e.g., by identifying such emails and classifying them as spam/suspicious. Currently, such
filters use features computed from the text, embedded links, sender domain, etc. of an email to
decide if the email is a phishing attempt. For example, an email that is visually indistinguishable
from one sent by a trusted entity, but with embedded links that point to online entities other than
the trusted entity, is an indicator of a phishing attempt.
DESCRIPTION
The visual look-and-feel of an email, including but not limited to a brand logo included in
the email, can provide useful cues as to whether the message is a phishing email or not. Per
techniques of this disclosure, visual signals that arise from the email are used to classify emails.
The techniques are able to perform the visual classification in a short time, e.g., < 10
milliseconds, and are scalable even for email service providers that serve billions of emails daily.

Fig. 1: Obtaining visual features of an email and using such features for classification
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Fig. 1 illustrates obtaining visual features of an email per techniques of this disclosure,
and using such features to classify the email. An email or a landing page is obtained (100) and
converted to an image (102). The image is re-scaled (104) to a predetermined canonical size and
form factor. The canonical size and form factor is based on performance, e.g., as measured via a
receiver operating curve (ROC), time-to-match, etc. Pixels of the image are quantized, e.g., to
three bits. A histogram is created (106) out of the re-scaled and quantized-pixel image, the
details of which are explained below. This histogram serves as a visual feature that is sent to a
classifier (108).

Fig. 2: An example 4x4 image illustrating histogram computation

The histogram computation is illustrated with reference to the example 4x4 image shown
in Fig. 2. The color of a pixel is mapped to an integer, color_value. The color is an (r, g,
b) vector, each vector component being three bits wide (due to the aforementioned
quantization). Mapping of the color to color_value is carried out via the formula
color_value =

64 ✕ quantized_b + 8 ✕ quantired_g + quantized_r.

Example: A pixel with (r, g, b) given by (7,7,0) maps to a color_value 504.
The (x,y) coordinates of pixels of a given color_value are grouped together to
form a component. For example, in Fig. 2, the yellowish pixels are grouped together to form the
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component {(0,0), (0,1), (0,2), (0,3), (1,2), (1,3)} where the first number refers to the row and the
second number refers to the column. For each component, the centroid is computed by averaging
the x- and y-coordinates of the pixels that belong to the component. A bin is created for the kth
component corresponding to color value k, with features such as centroid coordinate values
(x_k, y_k) and the quantized color coordinates (b_k, g_k, r_k). The entire image is
mapped to M such bins, with the kth bin being described by the feature [(x_k, y_k) (b_k,
g_k, r_k)]. The population of the bin, denoted n_k, is the number of pixels in the image
that have the color_value of the bin. The population is normalized to the weight value w_k,
such that sum of the weights over all the bins is unity.
The histogram corresponding to an image is fed to a classifier. The classifier analyzes the
histogram to classify images based on a distance measure such as the earth-mover’s distance
(EMD). For example, two images that have histograms are close to each other in the sense of
EMD are deemed to belong to the same class. Conversely, two images that have histograms that
are far away from each other in the sense of EMD are deemed to belong to different classes.
The EMD between two histograms is described as the amount of earth (samples) that
needs to be moved from one histogram to the other in order to make the two histograms
identical. Imagining each histogram as an earthen mound, the match process aims to make the
first histogram identical to the second by optimally moving earth from one location to another.
The number of samples to be moved and the distance of the move for each sample in feature
space are factored into computing the cost of the move. The cost drives the schedule of how
many samples from a bin in the first histogram are moved to another bin of the second
histogram. Note that the EMD computation seeks to minimize the global, not local, cost of move.
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Linear optimization formulations that compute the EMD between two histograms with
approximate O(N)complexity are utilized, where N is the number of bins.
The Rubner technique for computing EMD is an established technique to compare
intensity or color histograms of two images. This disclosure generalizes the Rubner technique
such that histogram features, e.g., component centroids, quantized color value vectors, etc., are
used during EMD computation. A pointer is provided to a comparison function between two
bins, where the bins belong to the two histograms being compared. For example, if the two
histograms have bins respectively described as:
Bin1_k = {(x_k, y_k) (b_k, g_k, r_k)}, and
Bin2_j = {(x_j, y_j) (b_j, g_j, r_j)},
the distance function computes a L2 distance between the centroid location and the color vector
respectively, normalizes each of these by the maximum possible value for centroid distance and
color distance, and computes a weighted average. Thus, the L2 distance d_{xy} between
(x_k, y_k) and (x_j, y_j) is computed. The L2 distance d_{rgb} between (b_k,
g_k, r_k) and (b_j, g_j, r_j) is computed. The overall distance is computed as
αd_{xy} + βd_{rgb},
where α and β are weighting parameters. An example selection for α and β is α=β=0.5.

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2018

6

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 1830 [2018]

Fig. 3: Histogram of EMD scores for same-brand landing pages (blue) versus different-brand
landing pages (red)

Fig. 3 illustrates an example of the performance of the EMD-based classifier described
above when applied to same-brand versus different-brand landing pages. The blue curve is a
histogram of the match score, e.g., EMD, between landing pages (both genuine and phished) of
the same brand. The red curve is a histogram of the EMDs between landing pages (both genuine
and phished) between different brands. As expected, the blue curve lies generally to the left, e.g.,
shows a greater frequency of smaller EMDs, than the red curve. As seen from Fig. 3, if the
match-score threshold is set at 0.1, at least 50% of the phished pages can be flagged without
incurring any extra false accepts. The problem of clustering landing pages is similar to the
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problem of clustering email renderings, although somewhat more challenging, as background
images in landing pages are occasionally different even for the same brand.
Alternative to using EMD as a distance metric for the purposes of classification, one may
use other distance metrics, e.g., sum of squared differences, sum of absolute differences, etc.
Other histogram-based metrics, e.g., scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT), histogram of
oriented gradients (HOG), can be used to classify email or landing-page renderings. Other
techniques such as near-duplicate detection, deep-learning neural networks, etc. can also be
applied for classifying email (or landing page) renderings. The criteria for choice of classifier are
false-accept vs. false-reject rates, time-to-match, etc.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes use of hand-crafted visual features of emails or landing pages,
and classification based on earth-mover’s distance, to assess the visual similarity of genuine and
phished emails. The techniques detect visual near-duplicates of a trusted entity’s email and
thereby achieve resilience against phishing attacks.

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2018

8

